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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 12-1827 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
     
v. 
 
JONATHAN BATTLES, 
       Appellant 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
 Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2-09-cr-00074-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 12, 2013 
 
Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and STARK,

 District Judge. 
 
 (Filed: February 28, 2013 ) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
          
 
STARK, District Judge. 
                                              

 Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Judge of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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 In this criminal appeal, Jonathan Battles challenges his conviction and sentence, 
each on multiple grounds.  We will affirm. 
I 
 As we write principally for the parties, our discussion of the background facts is 
limited to that which is most pertinent to an understanding of the issues we must resolve.
1
 
 On February 5, 2009, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted 
Battles on one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 
and one count of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (“Indictment”).  Also 
charged in the same Indictment were Angelique Torres and Tamika Booker. 
 Both counts arose from a scheme, engineered by Battles, in which Torres stole 
checks written by her employer, the City of Arlington, Texas, and sent them to Battles.  
Battles, in turn, gave the stolen checks to Booker to deposit in bank accounts Booker 
opened at Commerce Bank in Philadelphia.  Torres and Booker did not know one 
another; Battles had relationships with both women. 
 Torres and Booker pled guilty.  Battles chose to go to trial.  At his trial, Torres 
testified for the government.  Among other things, Torres explained that she had met 
Battles through a dating website.  She identified the phone numbers, addresses, and email 
information she used in communications with Battles.  She explained that Battles also 
visited her in Texas with some regularity, including on specific dates she verified.  At 
                                              
 1
We view the facts in the light most favorable to the government.  See Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
3 
 
some point, Battles asked Torres if she would be willing to take checks from Arlington 
and send them to him, and Torres agreed to do so.  Eventually, Torres sent Battles five 
checks she stole from Arlington – four payroll checks, intended for former employees of 
Arlington, and one check to a vendor that had provided services to the City – having a 
total value of $169,494.  These five checks are specifically identified in the Indictment 
and are dated between April and June 2007. 
 Torres further testified that in November and December 2007 she stole an 
additional eight vendor checks from the City of Arlington, which had a value of 
$708,682.  Torres explained that she took these checks because Battles told her that he 
needed more money.  She did not, however, send or give Battles these checks.  Instead, 
they were retrieved from her bedroom on December 19, 2007, when law enforcement 
searched her home. 
 Earlier on December 19, Arlington police officers had confronted Torres at work 
and asked her to come to the police station for questioning.  As she drove herself to the 
station, Torres called Battles, who told her not to tell the police about his involvement, to 
identify him by another name, and to delete phone messages and contact information she 
had for him.  Consistent with Battles’ request, Torres lied to the Arlington police, 
including by denying stealing checks and by giving a false name for Battles.  After 
further interrogation, however, Torres changed her story, admitted her role in the 
fraudulent scheme, and identified Battles. 
 Ultimately, Torres was interviewed three times.  Although all three interviews 
were video recorded, prior to trial the government did not produce any of the three videos 
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to Battles.  Instead, the government provided Battles only with written summaries of the 
first (December 19, 2007) and last (January 22, 2008) of the interviews.
3
  The 
government did not know about the intervening interview (January 18, 2008). 
 On May 5, 2010, following a three-day jury trial, Battles was convicted on both 
counts.  Battles then filed a “Motion for Relief from Verdict” and supplemental 
memoranda, alleging that the government violated its obligations under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The District Court held hearings on the motion on 
November 4, 2010 and April 20, 2011. 
 On January 10, 2012, the District Court issued a detailed Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, denying Battles’ requests for relief.4  The District Court found no Brady 
violation, explaining that the written summaries Battles had prior to trial of two of 
Torres’ interviews “provided ample material with which the defense could challenge 
Torres’s credibility, and Torres’s lies and omissions were explored both in Torres’s direct 
testimony and on cross-examination.”  (25a)  Thus, “none of the DVDs was material.”  
Id.   
 The sentencing hearing was held on March 16, 2012.  Battles objected to several 
portions of the presentence report (“PSR”), including the loss calculation, the 
                                              
 3The prosecutor had no recollection of seeing or turning over to Battles any videos 
and conceded, for purposes of Battles’ post-trial motions, that they had not been 
produced. 
 4
Battles sought to have his criminal judgment vacated and the Indictment 
dismissed with prejudice, barring a retrial.   
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enhancement for obstruction of justice, and the points added to his criminal history for a 
1992 state court conviction.  After hearing argument, the District Court overruled each of 
the objections.  Battles was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment, which was within the 
applicable advisory range of 110-137 months under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”).5  This timely appeal followed.   
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
III 
 We address below each of the grounds on which Battles attacks his conviction and 
sentence. 
A 
 Battles contends that the District Court committed plain error by instructing the 
jury on evidence that Battles had lied to law enforcement.  Battles argues that this 
instruction “had no evidentiary foundation and tainted the prosecution.”  (Br. 9)  
The District Court instructed the jury, in pertinent part: 
  You also heard the testimony of several law enforcement officers . . . . 
                                              
 5Specifically, by Judgment and Conviction Order entered on March 20, 2012, the 
District Court sentenced Battles to 60 months imprisonment followed by three years of 
supervised release for bank fraud and 120 months imprisonment followed by five years 
of supervised release for conspiracy.  The sentences run concurrently.  Battles is also 
required to pay $80,494 in restitution to TD Bank, the successor to Commerce Bank. 
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You heard testimony and argument that the defendant made certain 
statements outside of this courtroom to law enforcement authorities in 
which he claimed that his conduct was consistent with innocence and not 
with guilt. 
 
The government claims that these statements are false. . . .  If you 
find that the defendant made a false statement in order to direct the 
attention of law enforcement officers away from himself you may, but are 
not required to conclude that the defendant believed that he was guilty. 
 
It is reasonable to infer that an innocent person does not usually find 
it necessary to invent or fabricate an explanation or statement tending to 
establish his own innocence.  You may not, however, conclude on the basis 
of this alone that the defendant is, in fact, guilty of the crimes for which he 
is charged. 
 
You must decide whether or not the evidence as to the defendant 
shows that he believed that he was guilty and the significance, if any, to be 
attached to that evidence. 
 
In your evaluation you may consider that there may be reasons fully 
consistent with innocence that could cause a person to give a false 
statement that he did not commit a crime. 
 
Fear of law enforcement, reluctance to become involved, simple 
mistake, any of those may cause an innocent person to give such a 
statement or explanation. 
 
Of course, the defendant did not testify nor did he present evidence 
in this case.  All defendants have an absolute constitutional right not to 
testify or to present any evidence. . . . 
 
(97-99a) 
 
 As Battles did not object to this jury instruction, our review is only for plain error.  
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  
Accordingly, Battles must demonstrate that there was error that was plain, i.e., “clear” or 
“obvious,” that “affects substantial rights,” and which this Court should – in its discretion 
7 
 
– correct, because the plain error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 
 We find no error, as there was sufficient evidentiary support for the instruction.  
See Wells v. Murray, 831 F.2d 468, 477 (4th
 
Cir. 1987) (stating jury instruction requires 
evidentiary foundation); see also generally United States. v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 235 
(3d Cir. 1992) (stating jury instructions are reviewed in “light of the evidence”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 At trial, Deputy U.S. Marshal Roger Bomenblit testified that, on January 28, 2008, 
he spoke to Battles about co-conspirator Booker.  Marshal Bomenblit was trying to find 
Booker.  In response to the question as to when he had last seen Booker, Battles lied, 
saying it had been about two and one-half months.  When Bomenblit pressed further, 
Battles “changed his story” and admitted that Booker had stayed with him “until three 
weeks prior to that interview.”  (93a)   
 Battles cites no authority for his suggestion that, in order to be probative of guilt, a 
defendant’s false statement to law enforcement must be made at a time when the 
authorities are focused on the defendant himself.
6
  When Bomenblit confronted Battles 
on January 28, 2008, Battles knew it had been more than a month since the City of 
                                              
 6Battles likewise cites no authority for his suggestion that if his statement to 
Bomenblit could not be the basis for a prosecution for perjury – because he quickly 
corrected it – then it also may not be the basis for the challenged jury instruction.  See 
generally United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 782 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no 
question that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material 
fact as “affirmative evidence of guilt.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Arlington police had first interviewed his other co-conspirator, Torres.  Battles knew that 
he had engaged in criminal activity with Booker and that Booker might – if apprehended 
– implicate Battles in such criminal activity.  The jury could reasonably have concluded 
that Battles lied to make it more difficult for law enforcement to find Booker and, hence, 
more difficult for authorities to learn, from Booker, about Battles’ own criminal conduct.  
While the timing of Battles’ lie to Bomenblit could appropriately be considered by the 
jury as it assessed the weight to give this evidence (as the District Court instructed the 
jury to do), the untruthfulness of Battles’ statement provided an adequate basis for the 
challenged instruction.
7
 
 Battles contends that the jury instruction created “massive” potential for jury 
confusion because “the incident connected Booker and Battles in a time frame post-
conspiracy.”  (Br. 13)  He argues the jury might have mistakenly interpreted the 
instruction as permitting it to conclude that Battles was falsely protesting his innocence 
as to the Indictment charges, even though Bomenblit was investigating Booker as a 
fugitive.  We disagree.  The instruction properly directed the jury to give the testimony 
                                              
 7Battles also faults the instruction for implying that the jury heard evidence that 
Battles lied to “several” law enforcement officers, when the evidence supports only a 
finding that he lied to Bomenblit.  (Br. at 11)  Even if the District Court erred in this 
respect, such an error could not, in this case, have affected Battles’ substantial rights such 
as to require reversal.  In fact, there was no error, as the District Court correctly 
instructed the jury that it “heard the testimony of several law enforcement officers” (i.e., 
Bomenblit, as well as Secret Service Special Agent Lisa Koerber), not that it heard 
testimony that Battles lied to “several” officers.  Other references in the instruction to 
“law enforcement authorities” related to how the statements would be disseminated to 
multiple law enforcement authorities. 
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regarding Battles’ lie to Bomenblit whatever, if any, weight the jury believed it deserved.  
To the extent any potential for confusion existed, it is not such as to “seriously affect[] 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 
732 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
8
 
B 
 Battles next challenges the admission of a document he contends was hearsay.  
The document reported the results of a query in a database maintained by Commerce 
Bank reflecting transactions made in the Commerce “interactive voice response” (“IVR”) 
system.  As Battles did not raise this objection in the District Court – indeed, he 
stipulated to the admission of the IVR document – Battles must show plain error.  See 
United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 Stephanie Commini, an investigative analyst for TD Bank (the successor to 
Commerce Bank) testified that Commerce kept, in the ordinary course of business, a 
database showing IVR transactions.  Commini queried this database and found that 
someone calling from Battles’ phone number attempted to access Booker’s Commerce 
Bank account, and attempted to transfer funds, on April 19, 2007, two days after Booker 
had deposited a check stolen by Torres.     
 It is undisputed that Commerce maintained the IVR database in the ordinary 
course of business and relied on it in operating its business.   See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).  
                                              
 8In his Reply Brief, Battles asks us to strike footnote 6 from the government’s 
brief, as it references a police case summary which was not in the trial record.  There is 
no need to strike as our resolution of this appeal does not depend on the footnote.  
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The spreadsheet admitted at trial depicted a small portion of the IVR database that was 
relevant to the issues being tried.  That the spreadsheet excerpt was created for the 
purpose of litigation does not render it hearsay.  See United States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 
539 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Computer data compiled and presented in computer printouts 
prepared specifically for trial is admissible under Rule 803(6), even though the printouts 
themselves are not kept in the ordinary course of business.”) (internal emphasis omitted).  
As Commini was familiar with the Commerce IVR system, she was a proper witness 
through which the government could introduce the business record.  See United States v. 
Console, 13 F.3d 641, 656-57 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 Battles argues that “the document does not support the analyst’s conclusion,” 
characterizing Commini’s testimony that Battles failed in his attempt to transfer funds as 
“baseless” and “conclusory.”  (Br. 17, 20)  The record provides no basis for us to agree 
with Battles’ conclusions as to the meaning of the document or of Commini’s testimony.  
More importantly, neither Battles’ criticisms, nor the record, provides a basis for us to 
find error in the admission of the document. 
C 
 Battles contends that the government constructively amended the conspiracy count 
in the Indictment, violating his rights pursuant to the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Battles believes the Indictment was constructively amended by the 
admission of evidence showing an online “chat” he had with Torres in October 2007 as 
well as the evidence that Torres stole Arlington checks in November and December 
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2007.
9
  In Battles’ view, the conspiracy charged by the grand jury ended in July 2007, so 
the admission of evidence from after that date created a risk that he was convicted based 
solely on uncharged events occurring after July. 
 “An indictment is constructively amended when, in the absence of a formal 
amendment, the evidence and jury instructions at trial modify essential terms of the 
charged offense in such a way that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have 
convicted the defendant for an offense differing from the offense the indictment returned 
by the grand jury actually charged.”  United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259-60 (3d 
Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1985).  The “key 
inquiry is whether the defendant was convicted of the same conduct for which he was 
indicted.”  Daraio, 445 F.3d at 260 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “If a defendant is 
convicted of the same offense that was charged in the indictment, there is no constructive 
amendment.”  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 532 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 The Indictment alleged that Battles, Torres, and Booker conspired to commit bank 
fraud by stealing and depositing Arlington checks “[f]rom on or about February 2, 2007, 
through at least on or about July 6, 2007.”  (31a) (emphasis added)  Thus, the 
Indictment did not identify a termination date for the conspiracy charge.
10
  There is, 
                                              
 9
Battles concedes that he did not object to admission of the November/December 
checks.  (Br. 2) 
 10
By contrast, the bank fraud charge had an end date, alleging that the fraud 
occurred “[f]rom on or about March 2, 2007, through on or about July 6, 2007.”  (34a) 
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therefore, nothing inconsistent between the Indictment charge and the admission of the 
October chat and the November and December checks.   
 In any event, evidence of a person’s acts subsequent to the completion of a 
criminal offense may be illuminating as evidence of that person’s prior acts.  See United 
States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 281 n.25 (3d Cir. 2012).  Here, evidence of the 
continuing conspiratorial relationship between Battles and Torres after July 6, 2007 was 
probative of Battles’ guilt.  The government introduced travel records from American 
Airlines, which showed that Battles traveled to Dallas on November 7 and again on 
December 12, 2007.  Torres testified that she and Battles continued to be in contact 
through the end of 2007.  Just as there was no error in the admission of this evidence, so, 
too, there was no error in admitting the October chat or the November and December 
checks.  See United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 744-45 (3d Cir. 1974) (“[P]roof of 
the acts charged on any date within the statute of limitations and before the return date of 
the indictment is sufficient to support a conviction.”). 
 A variation between the trial evidence and the indicted charge is improper only if 
it modifies an element of the crime charged.  See id. at 744; see also United States v. 
Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 352 (3d Cir. 2011).  The essential elements of a conspiracy are an 
agreement to commit an act in violation of the law and an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.  See United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 356-57 (3d Cir. 2012).  Time 
is not an essential element of a conspiracy charge. 
Battles further argues that the chat was hearsay that was never authenticated.  The 
chat contained Battles’ own statements, making it admissible as non-hearsay.  See Fed. 
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R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).  The chat was authenticated by Torres, who testified that she and 
Battles engaged in the chat on October 21, 2007, and by Sharon Warnke, who testified 
that she found the chat in an account belonging to Battles that was left open on a 
computer she had loaned Battles when he visited her in late 2007. 
 The government proved – through, among other things, Commerce Bank records, 
video from the bank’s cameras, and Torres’ testimony – that what occurred was precisely 
what the Indictment charged: Battles persuaded Torres to steal checks from Arlington, 
Torres mailed those checks to Battles, and Battles gave the checks to Booker to deposit in 
Commerce Bank accounts.  Battles was convicted for the same conduct for which he was 
charged in the Indictment.  There is no substantial likelihood that he was convicted of a 
different offense.
11
  Accordingly, there was no constructive amendment and no error. 
 Based on the “chat” and check evidence, Battles also argues there was an 
impermissible variance between the Indictment and the trial evidence.  A variance occurs 
“where the charging terms of the indictment are not changed but when the evidence at the 
trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.”  Daraio, 445 
F.3d at 259.  A variance constitutes “reversible error only if it is likely to have surprised 
or has otherwise prejudiced the defense.”  Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 532 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, there was no surprise; indeed, defense counsel discussed the chat 
                                              
 11In light of the compelling evidence of Battles’ guilt in connection with the 
conspiracy as charged, we find no substantial likelihood that the jury viewed the chat as 
evidence of a second, separate, uncharged conspiracy – involving stolen invoices – for 
which the jury convicted Battles.  (Br. 24-25) 
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with the trial judge prior to trial.  As the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the 
government, supports a conviction on the single conspiracy charged in the Indictment, 
Battles has shown no unfair prejudice.  See United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (stating no impermissible variance occurs when, viewing evidence in light 
most favorable to government, reasonable jury could have found existence of same 
conspiracy as alleged in indictment).  We find no impermissible variance. 
D 
 The government failed to produce to Battles videotapes of any of the three 
interviews the City of Arlington police conducted with Torres, the government’s 
principal trial witness.  Battles contends that the government’s failure violated his rights 
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972), the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2. 
 We review the District Court’s findings of fact regarding an alleged violation of 
the government’s constitutional disclosure obligations for clear error.  See United States 
v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 886 (3d Cir. 1994).  We review the District Court’s conclusions 
of law de novo.  See United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).  We 
accord deference to the District Court’s determination that non-disclosed information was 
not material.  See id.; see also United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
 The government is required to produce to a criminal defendant all exculpatory 
evidence, including evidence that could be used to impeach the testimony of a 
government witness, when the reliability of that witness may be determinative of a 
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defendant’s guilt or innocence.  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-55.  
Mandatory disclosure of such materials by the government is intended to ensure that a 
“miscarriage of justice” does not result from suppression of evidence favorable to the 
accused.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).  Hence, the focus is on 
the fairness of the criminal trial, not on whether the prosecutor acted in good faith, see 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, or whether defense counsel was diligent in obtaining exculpatory 
evidence, see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-34 (1995) (stating Brady obligation 
exists even in absence of defense request). 
 A valid Brady claim “contains three elements: (1) the prosecution must suppress 
or withhold evidence, (2) which is favorable, and (3) material to the defense.”  United 
States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991).  Evidence is considered exculpatory 
and, therefore, “material,” “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433.  A “reasonable probability” is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.  See Bagley, 
473 U.S. at 682.  This same materiality standard applies to exculpatory and impeachment 
material.  See id. at 676. 
 Arlington police interviewed Torres on three occasions.  For the first interview, on 
December 19, 2007, the government produced a written summary, which noted that the 
interview had been videotaped.  Battles’ attorney did not request a copy of the video and 
the government did not produce it.  For the second interview, on January 18, 2008, the 
government did not produce anything, because the government did not have either a 
16 
 
summary or a recording.  For the third interview, on January 22, 2008, the government 
produced a written summary, which did not note that the interview had been videotaped.  
Battles’ attorney did not seek pre-trial production of the video of this interview. 
 The videos of the three Torres interviews run to a total of more than five hours.  In 
his briefing, Battles delineates in detail the contents of the videos.  (Br. 30-41)  The 
District Court, after viewing the videos, carefully compared their contents to the 
substance of what was disclosed in the written summaries of the December 19, 2007 and 
January 22, 2008 summaries that were produced to Battles prior to trial. 
 Having reviewed the record, we agree with the District Court that the undisclosed 
videos were not material.
12
  In United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 186, 188 (3d Cir. 
2011), we held that “undisclosed Brady material that would have provided a different 
avenue of impeachment is material, even where the witness is otherwise impeached,” but 
“it is only those new avenues of impeachment that sufficiently undermine confidence in 
the verdict that will make out a successful Brady claim.”  (Internal quotation marks 
omitted)  We have elsewhere held: “Where the district court applies the correct legal 
standard, its weighing of the evidence merits deference from the Court of Appeals, 
especially given the difficulty inherent in measuring the effect of a non-disclosure on the 
course of a lengthy trial covering many witnesses and exhibits.”  Thornton, 1 F.3d at 158 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, “impeachment evidence, if cumulative 
of similar impeachment evidence used at trial . . . is superfluous and therefore has little, if 
                                              
 12Counsel offered to make the videos available to us, but we find it unnecessary to 
view them, given the conclusions we have reached from the materials already before us. 
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any, probative value.”  Walker, 657 F.3d at 187 (internal quotation marks and emphasis 
omitted); see also United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding no 
Brady violation where government produced witness statements of agents but not grand 
jury transcripts). 
 Battles has not demonstrated that the videos would have provided him a different 
avenue for impeachment of Torres beyond those that were already available to him based 
on the evidence disclosed to him prior to trial, principally the written summaries of 
Torres’ first and third interviews.  The District Court accurately described the summary 
of the December 19 interview as follows: 
 The police summary of the December 19 interview is 
detailed, describing how over the course of the interview, 
Torres contradicted herself, was evasive, and lied to 
detectives about knowing Battles, her relationship with him, 
and the nature and extent of her interactions with him.  It 
reports that Torres initially gave a false name for an 
acquaintance in Philadelphia before eventually admitting that 
she knew Battles and that they had a relationship. 
 
 The summary also describes how Torres lied about 
whether she knew about or was involved in the theft of 
checks, before eventually admitting that she had taken five 
checks.  The summary notes that during the interview, Torres 
denied having any additional checks, but that a later search of 
Torres’s home uncovered a total of eight municipal checks 
and two additional vendor checks. 
 
(16-17a) (internal footnotes omitted); see also SA424 (summary of December 19 
interview, stating: “Throughout the interview, Torres was very evasive and this detective 
would confront her on the discrepancies in her responses at which time she would 
provide[] additional information.”). 
18 
 
 At trial, Torres testified in her direct examination that she agreed to plead guilty to 
conspiracy and bank fraud, and did so in hopes of receiving a “lighter sentence.”  
(SA121-23)  She expressly acknowledged that she had “lied” to the police about whether 
she knew Battles and whether she had stolen the checks.  (SA144)  On cross-
examination, Battles’ counsel questioned Torres further about being interviewed by the 
Arlington police, and had her confirm again that she was “not initially forthcoming” but 
instead was “revealing as [she] went through the conversation.”  (SA172, 180)  Counsel 
further established that, even after admitting to taking some checks, Torres continued to 
conceal that she had stolen others (that were eventually found in her home), and that 
Torres had lied to police about Battles’ name.  (SA180-81)  Counsel also questioned 
Torres about her guilty plea.  (SA176)  Finally, in response to one of counsel’s questions, 
Torres once again admitted unequivocally, “I did not tell the Arlington Police 
Department the truth.”  (SA182) 
 Battles identifies nothing in the three videos that would have provided him an 
additional avenue for cross-examining Torres that he did not already have available to 
him at the time of trial.  Further questioning of Torres on her lack of candor in her 
interactions with the Arlington police might have been effective, but it also would have 
been cumulative.  More importantly, particularly given that “virtually every aspect of 
Torres’s testimony was corroborated by documentary evidence and the testimony of other 
witnesses” (21a), there is no reasonable probability that disclosure of the videos prior to 
trial would have changed the outcome of the trial.  See Johnson v. Folino, __ F.3d __, 
2013 WL 163841, at *9 (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 2013) (“Suppressed evidence that would be 
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cumulative of other evidence or would be used to impeach testimony of a witness whose 
account is strongly corroborated is generally not considered material for Brady 
purposes.”). 
 Battles observes that the January 22, 2008 video shows Torres, at times, looking in 
a notebook, which Torres says in the video her sister helped her prepare.  Battles further 
notes that the government failed to produce prior to trial the envelope found in Torres’ 
home – that is, the envelope containing the additional stolen Arlington checks from 
November and December 2007 – which had Torres’ sister’s name on it.  While Battles 
did not know about the notebook prior to trial, he did know of the envelope, which was 
discussed at trial.  In fact, Battles’ counsel asked that the envelope be produced, and the 
prosecutor said he would look into it, but Battles did not follow up.  Hence, even without 
knowledge of the notebook, defense counsel was aware of an “avenue” for impeaching 
Torres based on suspicions of her sister’s involvement in the conspiracy.  Counsel, 
however, chose not to pursue this impeachment. 
 In the end, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not 
have received a different verdict with the [suppressed] evidence, but whether in its 
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434; see also Pelullo, 105 F.3d at 123-24 (stating 
cumulative effect of Brady and Giglio violations may result in verdict unworthy of 
confidence).  Here, Battles points to nothing in the record to give us reason to lack 
confidence in the jury’s verdict that he was guilty as charged. 
20 
 
 For the same reasons, we reject Battles’ contention that the non-disclosure of the 
videos was a violation of Giglio, the Jencks Act, or Rule 26.2.  See Hill, 976 F.2d at 142 
(“When undisclosed Jencks material is merely repetitious and/or cumulative of evidence 
available to the defendant at trial, the Jencks error can be deemed harmless, especially 
where the undisclosed pretrial statements do not contain impeachment material that 
would add to an already effective cross-examination of a key witness.”); see also United 
States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding no Giglio violation based on 
non-disclosure of tapes). 
E 
 Battles further contends that the government’s failure to produce the three videos 
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  Our review 
is plenary.  See United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 
extent, the defense might wish.”  Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (internal 
emphasis omitted).  “Confrontation Clause claims . . . should be considered in relation to 
the potential effect of the foreclosed cross-examination on the jury’s evaluation of a 
particular witness.”  United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 As already explained, the videos of the three interviews fail to provide any new 
avenues for impeachment of Torres that were not already available to Battles from the 
materials that were disclosed prior to trial, including the written summaries of the first 
and third interviews.  We agree with the government that “Battles does not identify a 
21 
 
single question that his attorney could have asked Torres, had counsel been in possession 
of the videotapes, which was not asked.”  (Gov. Br. 48)  Since Battles had an opportunity 
for effective cross-examination of Torres, the Confrontation Clause was not violated. 
F 
 Battles also challenges his sentence, asserting that the District Court committed 
error in its application of the Guidelines.  We apply plenary review to the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines and review findings of fact for clear error.  See United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Napier, 273 
F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing loss calculation); United States v. Powell, 113 
F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 1997) (addressing obstruction); United States v. Audinot, 901 F.2d 
1201, 1202 (3d Cir. 1990) (addressing criminal history calculation). 
 Battles first contends that the District Court erred in finding that the intended loss 
was between $400,000 and $1,000,000, leading to an increase of 14 in his offense level.  
The District Court’s finding was based on adding the value of the five checks listed in the 
Indictment, which totaled $169,494.94, to the value of the eight additional November and 
December 2007 checks found in Torres’ bedroom, which totaled another $708,682.15, 
for an overall intended loss of $878,117.09.  In Battles’ view, the District Court should 
have limited the loss calculation to just the five checks listed in the Indictment, which 
would have reduced his offense level by four points. 
 The checks found during the search of Torres’ home in December 2007 were 
properly treated as relevant conduct.  The District Court did not clearly err in concluding 
the thefts of these checks were acts Battles “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, 
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induced, procured, or willfully caused” and were also “reasonably foreseeable acts . . . of 
others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.”  U.S.S.G. 
1B1.3(a)(1)(A) & (B); see also United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 705 (3d Cir. 
2011) (including as relevant conduct acts that were part of same course of conduct or 
scheme occurring beyond date of charged fraudulent mailing); United States v. Stephens, 
198 F.3d 389, 390-91 (3d Cir. 1999) (including in loss calculation, as relevant conduct, 
acts occurring after expiration of statute of limitations). 
 Torres testified that when Battles visited her in Texas in December 2007, they 
discussed her stealing additional checks – which he said he needed for his business – and 
she did take more checks.  Torres still had the checks she stole in late 2007 when, on 
December 19, 2007, the police searched her home; her testimony was inconsistent on 
whether she intended to send the November/December checks to Battles.  However, 
given her testimony that she stole the checks after Battles told her he needed them, it was 
not clear error for the District Court to find that Torres’ theft of the November/December 
checks from Arlington was part of the same course of conduct and common scheme as 
her earlier theft of checks. 
  Next Battles challenges the addition of two offense levels for obstruction of 
justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1.  These two points were based on the discussions 
Battles had with Torres in December 2007 before and after Torres’ first interview with 
the Arlington police.  Torres testified that, as she was driving to the police station, Battles 
told her not to mention his name, made up a false name for her to use, and urged her to 
delete all of his texts and phone numbers from her phone.  He also told her to say that she 
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met co-conspirator Booker in a chat room.  In the later conversation, Battles asked Torres 
if she had told the police anything, and she lied and said she had not. 
 The District Court did not clearly err in concluding that Battles’ efforts to 
influence what Torres told the Arlington police and to encourage her to destroy evidence 
pointing to him constituted an attempt to obstruct the administration of justice with 
respect to the investigation of the offenses of conviction.  See United States v. Jenkins, 
275 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that attempt to obstruct state prosecution 
constitutes obstruction of justice in federal matter provided that, as here, there is “nexus 
between the defendant’s conduct and the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 
federal offense”). 
 Finally, Battles contends that his criminal history category should be V instead of 
VI, as the District Court incorrectly gave him three criminal history points, instead of 
zero or one point, for a 1990 conviction he received in the Montgomery County 
(Pennsylvania) Court of Common Pleas for theft and forgery.
15
  While we agree with the 
District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines as well as its calculation, some extended 
discussion is necessary to explain why. 
 On June 21, 1989, Battles was arrested and charged with theft by unlawful taking 
and forgery (“Montgomery Offense”).  This Montgomery Offense arose from Battles’ 
                                              
 15The District Court found Battles had a total of 14 points, placing him in criminal 
history category VI.  If, instead, the Montgomery theft and fraud conviction is accorded 
zero or one point, Battles would have just 11 or 12 points, which would place him in 
criminal history category V.  Holding his offense level constant at 25, Battles’ advisory 
Guidelines range would be reduced from 110-137 down to 100-125 months. 
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efforts to use another person’s identity to purchase a $60,000 BMW automobile.  On 
April 10, 1990, Battles pled guilty to the Montgomery Offense (“Montgomery 
Conviction”).  Then Battles failed to report for his presentence interview on the 
Montgomery Conviction, forging his own death certificate in an apparent attempt to 
excuse his non-appearance. 
 On January 10, 1992, Battles was arrested on a federal charge of use of an 
unauthorized access device, for which he was prosecuted in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania (“EDPA Offense”).  Battles pled guilty to the EDPA Offense on March 10, 
1992 (“EDPA Conviction”).  On April 8, 1992, Battles was sentenced to 18 months 
imprisonment on the EDPA Conviction (“EDPA Sentence”). 
 On April 30, 1992, Battles was arrested again relating to the Montgomery 
Conviction, for which he had still not been sentenced.  Battles was finally sentenced on 
the Montgomery Conviction on July 21, 1992, receiving “not less than eight nor more 
than 23 months imprisonment and a three-year term of probation” (“Montgomery 
Sentence”).  (PSR ¶ 53)  Battles was given credit for time served from January 10 to 
March 9, 1992 and from April 30 to July 21, 1992.  The Montgomery judge allowed 
Battles to serve the remainder of his sentence on the Montgomery Conviction at FCI 
Otisville, where Battles was then also serving his EDPA Sentence.  On September 13, 
1992, Battles was “paper-paroled” from his Montgomery Sentence to his EDPA 
Sentence.  (PSR ¶ 56)  
 Battles was released from federal custody on the EDPA Sentence on June 21, 
1993.  On August 6, 1993, he was again arrested.  On August 17, 1993, Battles was 
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sentenced in EDPA to 18 months imprisonment for violation of supervised release on his 
EDPA Sentence (“EDPA Violation Sentence”). 
 On October 19, 1993, Battles came into local custody from federal custody.  Then, 
on February 7, 1994, Battles was arrested in the Eastern District of Virginia and charged 
with three counts of bank fraud (“EDVA Offenses”).  Battles pled guilty to the EDVA 
Offenses on April 15, 1994 (“EDVA Conviction”).  On June 24, 1994, he was sentenced 
to 24 months imprisonment, “consecutively to any other sentence the defendant was 
serving” (“EDVA Sentence”).  (PSR ¶ 60) 
 On December 5, 1994, Battles was found to be in violation of the parole and 
probation imposed as part of his Montgomery Sentence.  Consequently, he was sentenced 
to “serve the balance of his back-time on the parole violation (16 months and 15 days) to 
run concurrently with a sentence of one to seven years imprisonment on the violation of 
probation” (“Montgomery Violation Sentence”).  (PSR ¶ 56)  Both portions of the 
Montgomery Violation Sentence were to date from October 19, 1993 – the date Battles 
came into local custody from federal custody. 
 On December 31, 1994, Battles was returned to federal custody, “prior to 
completing” the Montgomery Violation Sentence.  Id.  “As a result, the defendant was 
never paroled by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, and neither the state 
sentence [i.e., Montgomery Sentence] nor the state parole term [i.e., Montgomery 
Violation Sentence] was served by the defendant.”  Id. 
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 For this crime spree,
16
 the District Court counted a total of nine criminal history 
points, consisting of three points each for the Montgomery Conviction, EDPA 
Conviction, and EDVA Conviction.  Battles challenges the District Court’s application of 
the Guidelines to the Montgomery Conviction.  However, pursuant to Guidelines 
4A1.1(a), 4A1.2(e)(1), and 4A1.2(k)(1), the District Court did not err.  The Montgomery 
Conviction occurred within 15 years of the instant federal offense.  The Montgomery 
Sentence plus the Montgomery Violation Sentence totaled more than one year and one 
month.  Hence, three points were properly included in Battles’ criminal history. 
 Battles contends that he did not really serve at least 13 months incarceration on his 
Montgomery Sentence and Montgomery Violation Sentence.  Battles’ contention is 
essentially that he received a suspended sentence in all but name for his Montgomery 
Conviction.  Pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(3), “[a] conviction for which the imposition 
or execution of sentence was totally suspended or stayed shall be counted as a prior 
sentence under § 4A1.1(c),” which would mean it could count for no more than one 
criminal history point.  On this reasoning, Battles argues he should have received at most 
just one point, and not three points, for his Montgomery Conviction. 
 We do not agree.  The record establishes that Battles was sentenced to greater than 
one year and one month on the Montgomery Conviction.  His original Montgomery 
Sentence was “not less than eight nor more than 23 months imprisonment.”  To this is 
                                              
 16As the District Court observed, and as is obvious from this unfortunately lengthy 
explication of Battles’ pertinent history, “part of this problem is that there are so many 
things going on.” 
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added his Montgomery Violation Sentence, which was to “serve the balance of his back-
time on the parole violation (16 months and 15 days) to run concurrently with a sentence 
of one to seven years imprisonment on the violation of probation.”  It is true that during 
most (if not all) of the times Battles was incarcerated, he was concurrently incarcerated 
for other convictions as well.  However, there is no evidence to support Battles’ 
contention that his Montgomery Sentence and Montgomery Violation Sentence were 
essentially suspended sentences.   
 Battles’ reliance on decisions from two of our sister circuits is unpersuasive.  See 
United States v. Hall, 531 F.3d 414, 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Buter, 229 
F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“With a suspended sentence, the offender may never spend a day in jail.  The 
sentence hangs over his head as a way to ensure compliance with the terms of probation 
or other court orders.  [By contrast,] [c]redit for time served evinces the court’s 
determination that the offender must spend some time in jail but has already served that 
time, either awaiting trial or on some other offense.  It is a way to avoid excessive or 
duplicative punishment but does not reflect the court’s determination that this offense is 
so minor that no jail time is warranted.”).  Unlike Battles, the defendants in Hall and 
Buter had already finished serving the sentences against which they were given credit.  
Battles, by contrast, was given credit against federal sentences which he was still serving.  
See Hall, 531 F.3d at 420 (distinguishing between time served and concurrent sentences). 
The only reason that the amount of time Battles served solely on the Montgomery 
Conviction was so short was because he kept committing other crimes, not because the 
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Montgomery Sentence was suspended or the Montgomery judge felt prison time was 
unwarranted.  
 Battles had so many convictions that it turned out it took him longer to complete 
his federal sentences than it took to serve the state sentence.  Under these circumstances, 
the concurrent sentences are counted separately unless they were imposed in related 
cases.  See U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(2); United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 930, 934 (3d Cir. 
1991).  Battles does not argue – and there would be no basis to do so – that the 
Montgomery Conviction is in any way related to the conspiracy and bank fraud 
convictions he is appealing.  Thus, again, the District Court did not commit error.  
IV 
 For the reasons given above, we will affirm the District Court. 
